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Medical Malpractice Attorneys Knowledge
Base
Important Articles on Medical Malpractice and other relevant
legal issues written by ABPLA Board Certified Medical
Malpractice Lawyers
Medical Malpractice Articles by Tommy Malone, ABPLA
Board Certified Medical Malpractice Lawyer
CHANGES IN
MEDICINE – AN OVERVIEW OF HANDLING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES FOR
THE PAST FORTY YEARS
By: Thomas William
Malone
MALONE LAW OFFICE
Two Ravinia Drive, Suite 300
Atlanta, Georgia
30346
Business (770) 390-7550
Fax (770) 390-7560
www.malonelaw.com
Introduction
Upon graduation from law school in 1966, I returned home to Albany, Georgia,
to enter the practice of law. Times were very different
then. Some doctors still made house calls and most
patients paid their own medical bills. There was neither
Medicaid nor Medicare. Employment based health care plans
were not generally offered. Albany
was a southwest
Georgia
town of less than 100,000. Personal injury claims were rarely
tried and no one conducted voir dire examination. There
had not yet been a million dollar verdict in the entire state
and record verdicts in most communities were ten or twenty
thousand dollars. Lawyers representing claimants generally
negotiated the best settlement possible with the insurance
defense counsel or claims representative and avoided the
uncertainty of litigation. So-called “courtroom” lawyers
were to be found in the criminal defense bar.
My father had served as prosecuting attorney in the local court
for over 25 years when I entered the practice. His
practice included the examination of titles and real estate
transactions. To say my father discouraged me from
devoting my time to the representation of injured people would
be putting it mildly. He sternly admonished me that I
could never expect to earn a living practicing “personal injury
law”. Never being one to do what was expected, I
thoroughly enjoyed tilting the windmills in an attempt to hold
the rich and powerful accountable for the injuries inflicted as
the result of their carelessness. Much has changed since
those early days when it was virtually impossible to obtain a
verdict in favor of an injured patient. The purpose of
this paper is to review some of the factors which have brought
about a dramatic shift in the viability of the professional
negligence claim. More than any other factor, the mores or
attitudes of society have dramatically changed. Prejudice
has always been at the heart of any jury verdict and the
pendulum has simply swung in the direction of patients’ rights.
The medical negligence case remains one of the most difficult,
but it has become possible to obtain just verdicts in favor of
the victims of medical negligence in almost every venue in our
state. However, proper case selection and a full
appreciation of pertinent prejudices are necessary for success.
Historical Background
Many may think criticism of the medical profession is something
created by the modern trial lawyer. Not so!
Historically, society has had serious concerns about the medical
profession as evidenced by a statement made in 1544, in the acts
of Henry VIII:
“. . . for although . . . the . . . craft of surgeons have
small cunning, yet they will take great sums of money and do
little therefore and by reason thereof they do oftentimes impair
and harm their patients rather than do them good.”
Even though
members of the medical community have not always been
appreciated throughout history, it was not until the late 1840s
that medical malpractice suits began to emerge in the
United States. Several
historians have offered reasoning as to why Americans began to
sue their physicians. Those suggestions include: increased
competition in the medical field, advances in medical science
and the decline in divine providence beliefs.[1]
After this initial round of malpractice suits, the number of
suits increased slightly in the 1920s and 1930s. I believe
medical negligence suits in the early days were by and large
confined to the large metropolitan areas of our country.
It was not until the 1960s that the entire legal climate changed
when the Civil Rights Movement not only paved the way for
Constitutional guarantees but also consumer consciousness.
Consumers gained a voice in governmental decisions and consumer
rights were extended into several areas of law, most importantly
the right to hold those accountable for the injuries they
caused. Medical complaints and issues formally regulated
to ethics became important tort and civil right issues.
This new demand for justice was the impetus for rate of medical
negligence cases to triple between 1975-1985.[2]
In my experience, it was well into the 70’s and 80’s before
medical negligence claims became anything other than an oddity
in the State of Georgia
particularly outside metropolitan
Atlanta. It was quite unusual for any
case to proceed to trial in those days. And if the case
did, jurors were simply not prepared to hold a caring doctor
responsible for any consequences, unintentional or even
intentional. The following cases represent the difficulty
of trying medical malpractice cases 40 years ago and illustrate
how the changes in the healthcare industry have allowed injured
parties to receive a just and adequate award today.
Bitterman v. Johnson[3]
My first medical negligence case, Bitterman v. Johnson[4],
is a stark example of the immunity enjoyed by the medical
profession in rural Georgia in the late 1960’s.
Carol Bitterman was a beautiful 15-year-old high school student
who was administered azulfidine, a sulfur drug, by her
physician, Dr. Tom Johnson. Dr. Johnson was a board
certified internal medicine specialist who sang in the choir at
the first Methodist church and was a member of the most
respected medical group in town. He had documented Carol’s
allergy to sulfur in his office records. Carol’s
non-specific colitis lead to the administration of azulfidine by
her doctor who explained that azulfidine was a new kind of
sulfur and that she and her mother should not worry about her
past documented allergies to sulfur drugs. Fourteen days
into the regimen, she developed blisters which became huge
hanging water blisters that ultimately burst leaving her with
virtually no skin on her body, no hair, no fingernails,
toenails, eyelashes. Nurses described her as appearing as
if she was a peeled tomato. Her hospital bed sheets were
covered in corn starch to prevent her skin from sticking.
Carol developed an ascending paralysis, which stopped at the
level of her umbilicus leaving her unable to move or feel the
lower part of her body. After a six-day trial, the jury
returned a defense verdict. One of the jurors told me that
we would have won had the case been tried anywhere other than Albany. The preachers
of the first Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian churches came
to court and patted the good doctor on the shoulder in the
presence of the jury as did almost every physician in town.
If they did not testify for the defense, they showed up to give
support. I almost gave up the practice of law after that
devastating loss. Was there any justice to be found in the
courtroom?
Recognizing prejudice dictated the outcome of that trial, I
decided to put prejudice to work for Carol. The closeness
of the community to the doctor and the lack of alternative
services lost the case. Would jurors be more likely to
hold an “outsider” liable for the damage? I was determined
to find out. I associated the famous Melvin Belli of
San Francisco
in the case we ultimately tried together against Pharmacia
Laboratories[5],
the manufacturer of azulfidine. The prescribing information was
so deficient in warning of the hazards of sulfa drugs that I was
unable to use it in my cross examination of the crowd of local
doctors who testified sulfur was a harmless drug. One
local doctor even testified that he had prescribe enough sulfur
to fill up the courtroom and had never seen or heard of a bad
reaction to sulfur.
I believed a world famous
lawyer from San Francisco, a
local paralyzed girl and a
New Jersey
drug company in our hometown would turn the tables of prejudice
in our favor. My plan worked! The jury felt free to
hold the pharmaceutical company responsible because in their
minds “big business” did not care about them, “big business” had
harmed one of their own, and “big business” should pay.
This case foreshadows the juries’ attitude about managed
healthcare today.
After that trial, I proceeded to devote most of my time to
injury cases with a substantial focus on medical negligence.
In those early days, my losses throughout southwest
Georgia
were legion. Those losses included such cases as one involving
a penny in the throat of an infant with a history of swallowing
foreign objects. The penny went undiscovered by her
pediatrician who saw her for over a year after she was brought
to him. Another case was based upon a baby dying due to
blood loss in the mother who was kept bleeding in a rural
hospital where no blood was available. A wife and mother
received over 25 electric shock treatments in less than six days
and over six on the last day when she went into a seizure from
which she never returned. I even lost a case where a
gentleman suffered severe burns due to a plaster of Paris cast.
In that case, the manufacturer and the physician applying the
plaster of Paris were both excused by a rural jury with no
recovery for the plaintiff. The burns had to have been the
result of defective plaster or improper application. There
was no other explanation. In these cases I was unable to
sway the prejudices of the jury. It was clear that even
though the jurors were charged that they were not responsible
for the consequences of their verdict, the consequences were
obviously considered. Back then, physicians in rural Georgia
enjoyed what could best be described as absolute immunity.
My criteria for accepting medical negligence cases was rigid and
I considered these to be clear liability cases. Each time
I had proven my case, walking the jury through duty, negligence,
causation and damages. Those medical negligence cases were
defended on the basis of no carelessness as well as no
causation. The “so what” defense worked well in those days
in the face of damages that were always clear and catastrophic.
In 1979, I was to learn a great lesson. Medical
negligence cases are easier to win in big cities. I did not need
to bring in a famous attorney or a big business. If you prove a
doctor is a butcher in a metropolitan area, the jurors are quite
happy to run him or her out of town. In a small town he
may be the only surgeon there. The case of Jurczyik v. Musarra[6]
was tried in the United States District Court in
Atlanta
for a lady who had undergone reconstructive surgery following a
mastectomy. The reconstructive surgery was destined to
failure due to compromised blood flow to the area that had been
radiated. The surprisingly successful result convinced me
that there was something different about medical negligence
cases tried in the city as compared to those tried in the
country. It turned out the big city was all too familiar with
results of medical negligence and problems with healthcare
delivery.
All these experiences spurred my move from Albany to Atlanta.
I wanted to go where I could win cases. In rural cases
where the evidence imposed an obligation on jurors to award
enormous damages, I believe that since jurors may need the
defendant doctor’s services and they liked their town doctors,
these rural juries would return verdicts in favor of the
defendant. But now, how the times have changed. Now a
plaintiff is able to recover large damages in rural and
metropolitan areas. For either community, the pendulum has
swung toward plaintiff’s rights. One of the major reasons
for the jurors now holding a doctor or HMO responsible for
unintentional consequences is that healthcare has become a big
business and the profession has eroded. While being a
doctor was a noble profession, most doctors did not make a lot
of money. There was a time when you could pay your doctor
for his services in trade. Thirty years ago, doctors
served their community with a personal touch, dispensing your
medication and answering your questions. There was no
middleman. Now consumers are forced to deal with profit
motivated managed care plans that in the end have ultimate power
over medical decisions. The difficulty in getting
past the “gate-keepers” to specialists, limitations on therapy,
and the inability to simply change to a doctor of choice is now
universally understood and resented by most people. Juries
in both small and large towns recognize there is no longer a
closeness of the community to the professional and are incensed
when they find profit motivation is improperly and detrimentally
impacting on healthcare decision-making.
The juror of today insists upon the health care provider
affording the patient at least a minimal standard of care.
When a disastrous result occurs in the presence of carelessness,
no longer is the “so what” defense a safe haven for the errant
health care provider. As the following cases reveal, a
catastrophic result which occurs after a substantial departure
from what the jurors expect to be the standard of care can
produce a just recovery for the patient even if proof of
causation is daunting.
Jones v. Bashuk[7]
Mr. Jones was admitted with signs of a stroke on Saturday and
because of the failure to diagnose until Tuesday he suffered a
catastrophic debilitating stroke. Mr. Jones began
experiencing difficulty swallowing, as well as unsteadiness and
intermittent double vision. On Saturday morning, his wife
drove him to the emergency room. The emergency room doctor
initially suspected a stroke and requested a consult with a
neurologist because of the clear presentation of neurological
symptoms. When the neurologist arrived, he saw Mr. Jones,
interpreted a CAT scan without contrast as being normal.
The neurologist admitted Mr. Jones to the hospital with an order
for an MRI of his head “today or in A.M.” Although the CAT
scan was normal and it revealed no signs of a hemorrhagic or
bleeding stroke, an MRI would be needed to reveal whether Mr.
Jones was suffering from an occlusive or blockage stroke.
The hospital had the facilities to carry out the neurologist’s
orders for an MRI; however, no MRI technicians were at the
hospital. Due to holiday weekend and hospital policy of
not providing for an on-call MRI technician, a technician would
not return to the hospital until Tuesday. The neurologist
was not aware of the policy. Mr. Jones’ conditioned
worsened. He developed right-sided facial weakness,
transient numbness of his right hand, moderate unsteadiness, and
brief numbness on his right side. Mr. Jones did not
receive the MRI until Monday when he was taken to another
hospital. The film that was taken showed a recognizable
evidence of a stroke in the basilar area of the Mr. Jones’
brain. When Mr. Jones was returned to the admitting
hospital, the neurologist made no attempt to view the MRI
results. The neurologist was aware that Mr. Jones had been
taken to another hospital for an MRI study but he never called
the hospital, never saw the films, and never requested the films
be made available until Monday evening when he had a nurse
contact the other hospital’s radiology department. Because
the MRI was treated as routine and instead of the stat or
emergency which was charged, the radiologist had gone home for
the evening. The neurologist made no further attempts to
obtain the films or contact the radiologist. On Tuesday
morning, the radiologist interpreted the MRI as suspicious for
developing a stroke; however before this could be communicated
to the neurologist, Mr. Jones experienced respiratory arrest and
suffered a pontine stroke. The massive blockage at the
primary blood supply to the rear of his brain caused “locked-in
syndrome.” He can understand everything perfectly but can
only respond by slight eye movement. Mr. Jones is totally
dependent upon others for all activities of his daily life.
Suit was brought against the neurologist as well as both
hospitals. The defendants attempted to use the “so what
defense” by proving no one could guarantee the stroke could have
been prevented by prompt diagnosis and administration of
anticoagulant therapy. Our experts were of the opinion “to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty it was more likely than
not” that the effects of the stroke would have been less
devastating if a prompt diagnosis and treatment with heparin or
even aspirin had been instituted in a timely manner.
Heparin has been utilized in the treatment of strokes and is
generally recognized as effective in preventing the formation of
further clots. The jury recognized Mr. Jones would have
suffered some deficit even with diagnosis and anticoagulation in
a timely matter, but we effectively shifted the burden to the
defense to show what extent of injury was related to stroke
without heparin and what injury would have occurred with
appropriate therapy. An impossible task resulted in a
verdict for the whole. This was accomplished through a
theory advanced under the doctrine of indivisible injury.
Although this doctrine traditionally involves a single injury
produced by the negligence of two or more tortfeasors which
cannot be apportioned between them, it was effectively employed
here to include the underlying causative agent along with the
careless conduct of each of the defendants. The resulting
verdict was returned against all defendants.
A variation in the
application of the traditional doctrine of indivisible injury
may be employed in cases involving only one tortfeasor together
with one or more causative agents. In this setting, the
patient who is already experiencing an underlying medical
problem is met by the negligence of the tortfeasor doctor to
produce the disastrous harm to the patient. In other
words, while the patient may have already been experiencing
problems, the doctor’s negligence brought about the catastrophe.
The burden is now shifted to the defense to show the same result
would have occurred anyway. This is virtually impossible
to prove, the harm cannot be apportioned, and the doctor is
liable. Although a plaintiff’s attorney will still have to
prove causation, the task is less difficult because it may be
enough that the end results of the negligence are so severe.
The following case illustrates this:
Adams
v. Kaiser[8]
The Adams family was a member of a Kaiser Health Plan of Georgia. Kaiser in Georgia operates no hospitals of its
own, furnishing health care through staff physicians and allied
health care personnel who practice at its clinics. Kaiser
members receive hospitalization through Kaiser’s negotiated
contracts with independent hospitals. Mrs. Adams brought
her six month old son, James, to a Kaiser facility. The
Kaiser doctor diagnosed an upper respiratory infection with
postnasal drip following a brief examination. The doctor
recommended saline nose drips, using a vaporizer and Tylenol.
The doctor cautioned her not to be too concerned because even
temperatures over 105 degrees are not seriously ill. Mrs.
Adams went home followed the doctor’s instructions and awoke at
3:30am
to find her son more feverish. She called the Kaiser
Emergency/After-Hours number and reported to the nurse on duty
that her son’s temperature was 104; he was experiencing panting
breathing and was very limp and was not moving. The
after-hours nurse telephoned the on-call pediatrician and
generally related the James’ symptoms, failing to relay
significant parts of the information. The pediatrician did
not diagnose the child as having respiratory distress. The
nurse instructed Mrs. Adams to give her son a bath and to take
him to a pediatric hospital 42 miles away declining to give her
directions to the hospital. Thirty miles into the trip to
the hospital, the baby began experiencing severe difficulty
breathing, lost consciousness, and experience respiratory
arrest, which immediately lead to cardiac arrest. Mr.
Adams sped to the nearest hospital where the ER doctor
instituted emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation measures and
was ultimately able to get a pulse. James was transported
to a pediatric hospital where he was admitted with septic shock
and disseminated intravascular coagulation. The color
never returned to James’ extremities and eleven days later his
hands and feet were removed from his body.
We initiated suit against
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia under the doctrine of
respondeat superior based on the actions of the nurse. The
defendants attempted to use the “so what defense” because James
had meningococcemia, a usually fatal bacterial infection which
often times results in limb loss of those who do survive.
We were able to prove the nurse’s failure to treat this call as
a true emergency resulted in little James respiratory distress
proceeded to respiratory arrest and then cardiac arrest.
Had the nurse told Mrs. Adams to hang up and call 911 or go
directly to the nearest emergency room, James would never have
arrested and would have suffered only a minor loss of tissue, a
single digit at the most. The jury agreed the poor
delivery of care of a child in respiratory distress was
permitted to progress to cardiac arrest and lost his hands and
legs as a result of the interruption in blood flow. Once
again, an example of being unable to divide the injury resulting
from the properly treated underlying illness and the total
injury resulting from substandard care.
After over forty years of trial work, I have learned more
from my defeats than I have from my victories. Losing
“good” cases allowed me to learn how to understand the prejudice
that jurors carry with them. Justice is absolute. It
does not change with the times or follow public opinion.
As the Bitterman, Jones, and Adams
cases illustrate, in order to find justice for your deserving
client, you must discover the popular prejudice, separate it
from the injustice your client has suffered, and make it work
for the justice your client deserves. By doing this, you
are asking jurors to accept what they already believe which is
infinitely easier than attempting to persuade them to accept
what they do not want to believe.
The Future
It has been refreshing to go back home and out into other
areas of Georgia where it has become possible
in the right case to obtain just verdicts against errant health
care providers. Juries everywhere have been holding
doctors accountable for their negligence. The fact that
patients and doctors have been approaching equal footing has
caused a self-styled “crisis” among the medical and insurance
communities. Everyone with a television set has been
constantly bombarded with the need for “tort reform” based on
the notion of juries paying outlandish awards for outlandish
cases with little or no merit. This “crisis” is the
increase of medical malpractice in this country over the last 30
years. The increase may be explained by patient’s rights,
innovation, and the lack of disciplinary action by the state and
Managed Care Organizations.
The domination of Managed
Care Organizations (“MCOs”) is the most significant change in
medicine over the last thirty years. This change in the
healthcare industry may be the most responsible culprit in the
increase in instances of medical negligence.
Profit-motivated decision-making increases both the risks and
liabilities associated with the delivery of health care.
MCOs have the biggest effect on the quality of care and the
wrongful denial of access to medical treatment. While its stated
goal of containing health care costs is certainly laudable, the
reality is that managed care contains costs by restricting the
manner in which health care is delivered, oftentimes to the
detriment of the patients. In the managed care environment,
profit-motivated decisions have created a new category of
victims who did not exist before. When you combine
healthcare with discount contracts, fee withholding
arrangements, gag clauses, disastrous consequences will arise
with predictability.
What does the future hold
for the victims of medical carelessness and which way will the
pendulum swing? That, my friends, may very well be up to
you.
[1] See generally
Kenneth Allen DeVille, Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth
Century America: Orgins and Legacy
(1990) ; James C. Mohr, American
Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical
Perspective, 283(13) Jama 1731-1737 (April 2000).
[2] Mohr , supra
note 1, at 1736.
[3] Carole Janice
Bitterman by her next friend, Joseph Bitterman vs.
Thomas D. Johnson, Superior Court of Dougherty County,
Georgia, Civil Action No. 5580 (1969).
[4] Carole Janice
Bitterman by her next friend, Joseph Bitterman vs.
Thomas D. Johnson, Superior Court of Dougherty County,
Georgia, Civil Action No. 5580 (1969).
[5] Carole Janice
Bitterman by her next friend, Joseph Bitterman vs.
Pharmacia Laboratories, Inc., United States District
Court, Middle District of Georgia, Albany Division, Case
No. 1156 (1969).
[6] Carol H.
Jurczyik v. Mussara et al.,
United States
District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, Case No. 1:CV-79-0000041-P
(1979).
[7] Rex Leroy
Jones, et al. v. Robert
Glenn Bashuk et al., State Court of Fulton County,
Atlanta, Georgia, C.A.F. 98VS0137930C (1999).
[8] James Don
Adams, Jr. and Lamona K. Adams, et al. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of
Georgia, Inc., State Court of Fulton County, Atlanta,
Georgia, C.A.F. 93VS79895 (1995).
When you
choose an ABPLA board certified attorney you can rest
assured that you have one of the best malpractice lawyers in
the country.
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